Three months ago, we announced the resurrection of FIBRE.

In that article, we argued that mining centralization remains one of Bitcoin’s most pressing tail risks. We outlined three vectors that entrench mining centralization within the Bitcoin network: pool centralization, supply chain concentration, and infrastructural asymmetry. We also described the emergence of “proxy pools,” where apparently independent pools source block templates from a single underlying entity, effectively centralizing template production in a cartel-like fashion.

Much has been written on the Post-Quantum Problem (PQP). We won’t rehash it all. We encourage readers to review these writings if they are unfamiliar with the capabilities of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) and what risks such a device poses to the Bitcoin network. In short, a CRQC can break the fundamental assumptions on which Bitcoin’s key-security is based: with knowledge of only a public key, the corresponding private/secret key can be recovered.

Localhost Research is quickly approaching the one-year anniversary of its office opening. In that time, we’ve found our footing as a group and begun developing a team culture and vision for our future. We’ve also published three transparency reports, closely detailing some of our most exciting work.

The threat of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) has historically sat at the edges of technical discussions in the Bitcoin community. For many, a CRQC represented a risk that was hard to quantify and easy to dismiss, clouded by imprecise, narrative-driven hype.